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C06828875 Declassified Under Authority of the Interagency 
| security Classification Appeals Panel, 
E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3) 


ISCAP Appeal No. 2014-032, doc. 3 
Declassification Date: Jan. 3, 2022 


6 ‘ 7 | | cs Historical Raper 
: | : No. 160 
CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY ; 
THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 
1952 = 1956 


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Other copy heid by: DDP Controlled by: FI1/Divieion D 


. Date prepared: . 24 use 1968 
No. 2. of 2 Date published: | at 968 - 
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PREFACE, 2.0 ew ee 
LIST. OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
i.  INTRODUCTION.:.-. 


er Pe Githlittceneanenmnamnnnceser Whe 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


1% * PLANNING »- @ a » e 


ZEY1. IMPLEMENTATION. . 


IV, ‘TERMINATION . . . 
V. PRODUCTION. . . . 


Appendix. A’ 
; Appendix B. 


Appendix C 
Appendix D 


- Analysis of the Reasons for 
Discovery of the Tunnel 


$i. AFTERMATH ra ‘d - 


Recapitulation of the Intelli- - 
gence Derived 


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‘the. 


Typical American Press Comment 


Kast German. Press. Conment 


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PREFACE 


PBJOINTLY (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being 
Sometime in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and 
ceased as an active operation in the simmer of 1956, The 
writer served as Headquarters case. officer on the project from 
the winter of 1952-1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as 
the field case officex until February 1955. 
vee la senior Office. of Communications 


officer in the project; Mr. William K. Harvey, Chief, Berlin 
Operating Base, 1962-1958; and. . 


F1I/Division D, 1952-1958, were intimately associated with the 
planning and implementation of the project at the policy level 
and very kindly offered Buggestions for the preparation of 
this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and 
are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals, including 
he iwho Were in a position to offer valuable 


advice: were 


pS Ais ten Ret Ba tacd 


absent from Headquarters during the period the 
paper was being prepared and thua unavailable to assist. 

When this: project was first discussed with the. then 
Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in 
the interests of security, as little as possible concerning 
the project would ‘be reduced to writing. It is probable that 
Sew orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet. there 


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are a great many cubic feet of files. connected with this pro- 


‘ject. These files mainly concern technical and administrative 


matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the 
weiter, are hecessary to a broad understanding of the manner 
in which the project 's objectives were accomplished have been 
dineluded in this paper. Those interested in additional data 
may Wish to consult the files, 

In’ addition to setting forth significant developments, 
the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons 
for certain courses of action. At times. this required a 


speculative approach, The judgments derived from such specue- 


‘lation were shared by all those actively concerned in the 


management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that 
‘they are accurately expressed in the following paper. Any 
error in this respect, however, is the. sole responsibility. of 


‘the writer. 


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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 


Map of Berlin 
Detail Map of Rudow Section, Berlin 


Aerial View of Rudow Section, Berlin 
‘Dirt in the Basenent | 

-Yopos: Studying the Installation 
-Bast German View of the Compound 


Blinds on the Shield 
Excavating Using the Blinds . 

View of the Completed Tunnel 
Construction of the Vertical Shaft 
Completed Vertical Shaft 

view of Cables and Taps 


Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Waréhouse Basement. 


Converted Fork Lift. and Dirt Box 
Target. Cables Exposed 
Schematic View of Tunnel 


Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber 


Pre-Amp. Chamber 
Tapping Bridle 
Lead-Away Lines 


Soviet. Press Briefing 


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I, INTRODUCTION 


The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a 
tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is 
ie oe gomewhat obscure,’ A number of factors must be cons idered, — 
.or among them the following: 
: a. As early. as 1948 U.S. Intelligence Officers 
became interested in the benefits to be derived fron . 
tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a scale not 
previously considered necessary. ‘The loss of certain 
« oo ‘gourees during this period created gaps. in our intelli- 


gence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during. 


this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident | 

that. the tapping of certain selected landlities: might pro- 

a : = duce the information needed to fill. a number of the gaps: 

ad in our overall intelligence picture. | 

‘bd. in the late 1940's and early 1950's the U.S., 

through the briefings of "returnee”™ German. scientists: 

(those who were teken by the Soviets after World War II 

. ii to work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a 
‘new Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets. referred 
‘to harmed ag “VHE cuz. = It soon became evident that 

1, ee ‘In normal. ugage "VHE CHE" means "high frequency”. ‘The 

Soviets, however, in context, used this term for a special 


speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their 
high level comminications, 


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a. "es _ In the late 1940's the Office of Communications,. . 
ae in the course of its continuing ‘efforts to provide secure 
r° communications for the Agency , became aware of a principle 
which, when applied to target communications, offered 
: certain possibilities. Plans to exploit: this technique 
) : : 
were imnediately formulated. 
‘ These factors then served as additional incentives (above 


and beyond our normal collection requirements) to ‘foous atten- 
tion on Soviet landline targets.. In mid~1951 exploratory 
digcusgions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an 
attack on Soviet landlines in Fast Germany with special empha- 
sis to be placed on the Berlin area, As a result of this 


1 
conference ; SOX 


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S0X1 an agent network was set up which was 
successful in penetrating the East Berlin office of the East 


German Post and Telecommunications network. 


Vital information on the S0X1 
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S0X1 first became available 50X1 


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duxing the latter part. of 1951; and by March 1952 all of ‘the 
pertinent technical material had been assembled and sufficient- 
- ly analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important 


Soviet circuits. ale 


50X1 


SOX1 | 
Subsequent events proved , 


this information to be completely correct, 

Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored 
‘and one sampling operation was run in the Rast Zone, unfortu- 
nately with negative results. By January 1953, however, the 


effectiveness of the penetration network 50%! 
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had become such that a 15-minute sample 
was obtained of the prise target circuit. ‘This was accomplished 
by. Oot 
SOx4. 


cable pair to the. West Berlin Post Office where it was recorded. 


| ie 50X11 
This operation continued for some six months 


oi for a total of 
almost. two hours. The longest continuous sample obtained wag 
29 minutes and ‘most samples were of two to three ninutes’ 
duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that 
ee it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six- 


month period on "our" end of the cable to record these 


3 i ° 3 


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samples 
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Meantime collateral collection effort ‘continued on the 
comminications systems involved and the Office of Conmunica- 
tions developed techniques for recovering. the text. from the 
magnetic tape recordings of the: target signal. Somewhat 
ironically, the firet actual material recovered proved to be 
@ recording of a ‘student teletypist practicing on the "home 
keys". ' White ‘perhaps ‘disappointing from the ‘standpoint ‘of 
intelligence content, this material served to prove the tech- 


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nical possibility 


50X1 


At: this point (mid-1953) we knew it could be done - the next 
step was the problem of installing: a permanent: tap on the 
target lines. 

Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the 


purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus 


cannot be pinpointed. In‘1951, the British advised CIA that 


they had for some years been tapping Soviet cables through a 


system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the 


take with the U.S. . The suggestion. was made by the British at 


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the time that: similar opportunities might be present in the 


Berlin area. While it should perhaps bé possible to credit 


one individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a 


bit difficult to do so. At any rate’, the British. and CIA. 
continued. to pool collateral ditormatioa, and by Way 1963 —| 
the idea of a tunnel to 


tap the target cables began to take definite shape.. | 


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PLANNING. 
Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible 
| ~ to ae from the U,K, or the U.S,. Zones to the target cables : 
7 served to narrow the choices to two spots: one in the British 3 
7 and one in the U.S. Zone. The site actually ‘used (see figs. : 
1, 2, and 3) was selected after careful deliberation which . 
}; included, but was not limited to, the following factors: ¥ ; 
; a. The location of the permanent water table : 
(which tg: normally relatively high in Berlin} was ascer~ 
tained to be 32 feet below ground surface. It was con- : 
i sidered that this, fact would obviate the necessity for | 
the use of compressed air, watertight locks, and water- | 
| tight construction with a corresponding reduction in the 
: attendant engineering problems. ! 
| bs The length of the tunnel was considered to be : 
: not. impractical. although it far exceeded anything which ! 
h had been done: by the. British in Vienna : 
; Gs Land yas available on which to construct an 
7 installation from which to begin the tunnel. 

F ‘d. Complete collateral information on the area 
i was available, including the target cable plans, aerial | 
1 photographs, and the plans for all utilities serving the : 
< area, —— . 
| 

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Figure 1 ~- Map of Berlin 


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At this point the: following major questions. remained 


unanswered; 


A. Was it indeed. possible to dig a tunnel. of ‘this 
magnitude (approximately 1500 feet) clandestinely, con- 
sidering the fact that the border at this point. was 


heavily ‘and constantly patrolled by the East orm Ns 


and hit the targets? 


b. If the answer to the above: was ‘favorable, 


what ‘was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approxi- 


. mately 3,000 tons of sand)? 


c.. What. type of cover installation could be built’ 


im such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that 


tine a “squattersville" of shacks and hovels constructed 
from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)? 


in retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnei be 


dug?", was. never really a debatable one--~those concerned more 


or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the. | 


en he done. ae eae earn pene ree 


minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great. many — 


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ingenious ideas were brought forth.and discarded for one rea~ 


son or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that 


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we "aig a hole and-“put the dirt in ate i This in effect was 


sks adiudisas? At - thia tine no convincing, cover story had 


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suggested itself and the current consensus favored naking the. 
cover. compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with s 
rather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed 
for one reason or another in & semote area of Beriin. Space 
requixenents for the recording and associated equipment were 
such that a building. of warehouse proportions was needed; 50. 
it. was: decided to build a two-story warehouse. Local. engineers 
were told that it had been decided to experiment ‘with a new 
type of warehouse, one which ‘would be half above the ground 
and half below with a ramp suitable for running fork lift 
trucks fxom the basement to the first floor. Berlin had been, 
selected as the site for this warehouse because (a) construc< 
tion would be cheap due to Jow labor rates and (b) the work 
would benefit the Berlin economy. So the basement Was dug 
linder the eyes of the local border guards and we had ‘our hole 
to put the dirt. in" = (See fig. 4.) 

While the "warehouse cover" was adjudged sufficient to 
solve the temporary problems of construction, it was not deened 
solid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At 


this particular tine the intelligence community was becoming 
| 


increasingiy interested in the potential of 
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2/ as an interesting sidelight, ‘we heard | later that the 
Quartermaster Corps becane seriously interested in this: type 
construction because the ratio of cost to storage space 


‘available was amazingly low. We do not know if any follow~ 


up ever occurred. | 
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For example: 
m@. Excuse. was provided for maintaining extra- 
ordinary physical security and tight. compartmentation. 


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in the Top Secret 


category at this period in its evolution.) 


—_— 


SOX1 


c. Legitimate targets 50X1 
existed in the area. 

d. ‘The. existence #4 at 
the site provided the opposition with an explanation for 
the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form 
of axe presents a priority target, 
it was. argued that presenting the opposition with 2 reason 
for the site's existence would make it a less prominent 
target than leaving it a "mysterious something." The . 

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site did in fact. 2%! In 
addition, the sight of ‘the Soviets: and East Germans. standing 
on top of. the tunnel with binoculars focused os 

50X1 


on the roof of the installation provided 
considerable amusement to personne} at the Bite. (See fig. 5.) 

Joint U.S.-U.K. planning for ..the project continued, 
throughout. 1953 and in December of that year the. Director of , 
Central Inteliigence approved the ‘terms of reference which 
— formal négotiatiois: with the British for the implenen~ 
tation of the project’. A seriag of cénfexrences in late 1953 
and early 1954 ied to. the f6llowing decisions: 

a. The U.S, would; ; 

(1) procure a site, erect the necessary 
structures, and drive a tunnel. to a point beneath. 
the target. cables: 

(2) be responsible for the recording of all 
Signals produced rai 
50X1 rr 

(3) procese in Washington all of the tele- 
erephle materiel. received cxon the project. 

b. The British would: 
(1). dstve a. vertical shaft from ‘the venvett e 


end to the targets; 


10 


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Figure 5 = Vopos Studying the installation 


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Figure 5 - Vopos. Study 


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(2) effect the cable taps and deliver a 
usable signal to the head of the tunnel for 
recording; and 
(3) .provide. for a jointly manned U.S.<U.K. . : 
center in London to process the voice recordings 
from the site: | 
It. was. jointly agreed that each side would keep the 
other. advised in det&il on. all aspects of the project. It 
should perhaps ‘be saidg here that. the. bilateral aspects of this 
operation (with one notable exception which will be discussed 
later (see BLAKE; page 23)). caused few, if any, problems. The - 


skills developed by the’ British during the Vienna operations. 


e stood us in good. stead and the distribution of effort and ex~ 
= pense proved in the end to be reasonably equitable. 
Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps 
‘Were taken to lease the -necessary land ahd right-of-way ease- 
ments for the site and pccaaevart was let With a German con-~ 
tractor. The compound, which ‘was roughly the size of an. ayer~ 
age city block, was fenced with chain-type high security 
fencing and contained the main operations building (the one 
; story with basement type warehouse. previously described), 
conbined kitchen~dining facilities. and barracks, and another 
building which housed three diesel driven generators to 


provide power for all facilities. (See fig. 6.) Sanitary 


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Figure 6.-. fast German View of the Compound 


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provisions consisted of a cesspool. (The logical placement 
of the cesspool was such ‘that it was situated only a few feet 
from the tunnel site. It jater developed when the turnel ‘was 
dug that. this was quite unfortunate becaise working conditions 
in the sector adjacent. to the cesspool were; to say the least,. 
highly unpleasart.) Planning called for the completion of 
this work: on 27. August. 1954. 
‘For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was. | 
decided to request help from the Arny Corps. of Engineers, 
and to this end the Chief of Staff and the G-2, U.S. Army, 
were briefed on the project.’ ‘the initial contact with the - 


on 


Army was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles to General 


Matthew 3B. Ridgway. Fortunately General Arthux Trudeau, a 
trained engineer, had just peen appointed A.C. of S., G=2. 
From the first moment he. learned of the operation, General 
Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. The 
Army selected Lt. ColonelLeslie M. Gross (the only available 
member of the Engineering Corps with any experience. in 
tunneling) to head. the presect. This proved to be an excellent. 
choice for Lt. Colonel Gross turned in. an outstanding job. By 
nid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans, 
gelected a crew of engineering personnel, and actually con- 
structed a mock-up tunnel some 150. yards long working under 


operational conditions at a high security base in New Mexico. 


- 12. 


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Some mention ‘should be made of the actual method of construct- 


ing the tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin 


area showed a high percentage of gand. ¥or this reason it was 


decided that. the tunnel should be.lined with steel. The same 
sand content: contributed greatly to the danger of cave~ins at 
the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield 
was devised (see figs. 7 and 8) with horizontal "blinds" 
so arranged across its face that should: even dry sand ‘be | 
encountered the danger of cave-ins was -virtually eliminated. 


The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate 


so constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed 


a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches > 


long. Provision was made for. bolting these vings together to 
form a continuous tube of solid steel. Thé men worked under 
cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger 
in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material 
had been excavated, the shield was. forced forward with hydrau- 
lic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in piace. 
Since. this method left a void of approximately one and one- 
half inches around the liner (remembering that the diameter 

of the shield was greater than that of the liner), screw-type 
removable plugs were built into every third section of. tunnel 
liner. This permitted renoval of the plugs ‘and the forcing 


of grouting material under high pressure ta fill the void 


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after the liner was.in place: It was caleulated (and subse- 


quently proven to be true) that this method of construction. 


would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the 


tuniel from the surface. (See fig. 9.) 


Meantime in the U.X. British engineers constructed a nock— 
up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious 
device which worked in principle like. the tunael “shield 


described above, with the difference, of course, that the 


blinds (which closely resembied. a conventional venetian blind) 


were horizontal but. so hinged as to ‘permit vertical exeavation. 
This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face. of 
the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking the. entire 
structure up at the optimum rate. (See fig. 10.) Available 
plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches 
deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top 

of the vertical shaft (see. fig. 11) then needed to he 
approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the high- 
way. in. order to give the tappifig crew reom to work below the 
eelling of the shaft, and the whole gtrapture- ad -<6 be 
capable of supporting the weight. of. heavy trucks since the 
tunnel and tap chamber lay diréctly beneath the highway. (See 


fig. 12:) Considerable care was devoted to insulating the 


14 


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tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum. 


Considerable thought was given to. the. quantity and 


content: of the material available from, the target and the 


manner in which it. was to be processed. It was in this 


field, perhaps; that we experienced some of our greatest 


problems. It. had been decided very early in the project's 


planning stages to maintain the strictest. possible security 
Measures. As a minimum precaution security checks were made 


on each. individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the 


project's mission, and the same standards in force for. clear- 


ances for Special Intelligence were utilized, A. list. of 
briefed personnel was maintaitied, special secrecy agreements. 
were exectited, and special briefings were given.to a11 knowl- 
edgeable personnel. It was in the assemblage of a processing 
team that we experienced our greatest problen in maintaining 
security standards. Since the material to be’ processed was. 
largely Russian voice, it. was thought that we would need 


linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic 


that native fluency is usually available only in Ratives, and 


3/1 Spite of the insulation, it was a weird. sensation 
‘to be in the chamber when. an iron-shod horse trotted across. 
it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning 
when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a 
continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away 
the. fog, visual observation. showed that the East German 
police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly 
over the chamber, The "thuds" the microphone picked up were 
caused by the police officer in charge ‘stomping his feet ‘on 
the road surface to keep warm. 


15 
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hatives were hot clearable for the project, Although we were 
never successful in obtaining as many linguists’ as we needed, 
‘we were successful, through careful screening and intensive 
language training, in asgembling a minimum crew for the job. 
This necessitated screening each personnel file in the Agency 


of those individuals who claimed any knowledge: of German or. 


Russian, arranging interviews and language tests, and negoti- 


ating ‘transfers to the project. The Agency's language capa- 
bilities then were considerably less than now and some of the 


negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult, 


16 


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II. IMPLEMENTATION | 


By 17 August 1954 shinee were beginning to take shape 
and the ‘situation. was as ‘follows: 

a. The German contractors had completed the 
compound and ue eage in possession. ; | 

b. All of the basic supplies, equipment, and — 
personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction 
on the tunnel. This in itself involved transporting 125. 
tons of steel tunnel Liner from the ZI. to Berlin. The 


initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted 


‘of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of any pack- 


age of which could have biown the project. For security 
purposes all sensitive” items, such as the tunnel Liner, 
were double crated and handed and subjected to severe 
drop tests before they left the ZI. - Similar items were 
differently packaged for deception. purposes. | 

c., Space at. Headquarters was secured and the 
Office of Communications had assembled a crew and was 
well under way in fabricating the. unique equipment - 
necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic. 

d. Initial personnel had been selected and were 
being processed for both the Main Processing Unit. (MPD} 
in London and the Technical. Processing Unit (TPU) -in. 


17 


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Washington. “tt should be noted that personnel and equip- 
ment gauve programmed initially to exploit approximately ) 
ten percent of the anticipated take. in Keevoapect > pers 
haps this could be considered overly cautious. In : 
justification of this decision it should be said that ‘no 
one had ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine condi- 
' tions with the expectation of hitting a target. two inches 
in diameter and 27 inches below’ a main German/Soviet 
ini ghway . There were those who manifested certain reser— 
vations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly 
to the: credit. of those senior officials, both civilian 
and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the 
project was permitted to proceed, 
In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter 
was started in the warehouse basement floor (see fig, 13) and 
ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the pre- 


dicted 32 feet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken 


under the steady observation of: East German border guards and 


Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this 


particular spot, creating a "perched water table” the magnitude 


of which was unknown. Available ififormation indicated that the 


Clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target 


-_ 


and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the 
top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated. 
18 | 


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Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling 
operations. stopped each time the German guards walked over 
the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were instalied 
to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were 
maintained, and since the highway under observation was the 
main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport, consid- 
erable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also 
possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance: 
of individuals visiting Rast Berlin by observing the security 
precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets. 

Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags 


as the tunnel proceeded and the. excess spoil was hauled back 


to the basement of the warehouse. ' To facilitate movement, a 
wooden track was Laid on the floor of the tunnel and a. con- 
verted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubber- 
tired trailers back ard forth ina the tunnel]. (See fig. 14.) 
Cool air was supplied to the face. of the tunnel through duct- 
work. from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse. 
The tunnel was completed on 28 February 1955.. Construction 
of the tap chamber commenced 10 March 1955 and was completed, 
with the three target cables exposed, on 28 March 1955. (See 
fig. 15.) 

To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to 
remember that the tunnel was 1,476 feet Long (roughly the. 


19 


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Figure 15 - Target Cabled Sxposed 


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length of the Lincoln Menorial reflecting pool). and that. the i 
first half sloped down and. the second half sloped up. (See 

fig. 16.) The lack. of aD. adequate bage line made the survéy- 

ing problem especially. difficult. The engineers decided. at 

one point that an object of known size in the East Zore would 

be useful as a reference point, ‘so a baseball game was organ- | 
ized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into os | 
East. Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the 
friendliness of the East Merman guards who kept: returning the 
baseball. j Wonetheieany the eneneers “expressed ‘confidence 
that they a ‘their position. wien the’ tunnel was completed _ 


to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cube. They 


were correct. . EY 

°: Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies 
of electronic equipment. To guard against thie: peébien the 
section of the tunnel dimediately adjacent to the tap chamber 
was insulated and sealed with marine—type plywood to form; in 
effect, a closed room. (See figs. 17 and 18.) ‘Vapor barriers : 
were erected and, in addition, a heavy. "anti-persennel"”. door 
ef steel and concrete was constructed to seal off. the tunnel 
some..15 yards. from its terminal. end. From the béginning it 
was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. 
Considerable. thought was given to the posture: the U.S. Govern- 
ment would adopt pron the tunnel 's discovery and to those 

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Figure 16 - Schematic. View of Tunnel. 


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Figure 17 - Initial Stage of. Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber 


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measures which would be taken at the ‘site. The following 
position was finally approved: 
a. The posture of the U.S. would be one of flat 


4 
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denial of any knowledge of the tunnel, 

b. The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed 
the East-West: Zone border with demolition charges capable 
of: craving in the tunnel tiner should the Soviets attempt , 
forcible entry into the cover installation. 

c. The “anti-Personnel” door descrihed above was 
installed. = 

d. It. was agreed that the installation would be 
defended against forcible entry with all means at hand. 
The three. cables were tapped on 11 May 1955, 21 May. 1955, 


and 2 August 1955. All equipment for isolating and preampli- 


fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for record-. 
ing was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring 
of each paix could begin as soon as it was tapped. {See figs. 


19 and 20.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and 


4/tnis door bore the followitg inscription featly lettered. 
in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of. the 
Commanding General." -It was: reasoned that this sign might give 
pause. to Soviet. and/or German officials and gain time. As.a 
matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals. who 
considered the ‘posting of this Sigh aS one of the most auda- 
cious aspects of the entire undertaking. 


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humidity in the tap chanber to prevent the possibility of the 
introduction of moisture into. the target cables thus causing 
faults, ‘The moisture in the air caused. by the breathing and 
perspiration of. the technicians doing the tapping cperation 
forced the suspension of the operation several times to 
permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the 
chamber, All the components in the electrical isolation net— 
works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous 
tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables 
were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed. in 


a 


lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone 


company. standards. The strictest possible visnal watch was 
maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all 


aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee 


success: even though in many instances it meant delay in 


achieving the objective. 


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IV. TERMINATION. 


The tunnel was discovered (see fig. 21) 22 April 1956, 
after 11 nonths and 1 days of operation. A menorandun pre- 
pared on 15 August: 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as 
Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of 
that date on the réasons for the discovery. The. conclusion 
reached was that the ‘loss of this source was purely the result: 
of. unfortunate circumstances. beyond our control - a combina- 
tion of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor 
physical condition (this was known from the beginning) and a 
long period of unusually heavy rainfall. “It appeared that water 
entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inopera- 
tive, thus: necessitating digging up sections of the cable and 
causing discovery of the tap. 


Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason 


for the demise of the operation. In April 1956, MI-6 discov- 


ered that Gedrge BLAKE, case officer. in their service, had 
been recruited by the ‘Soviets while a prisoner in North Korea 
in 1952 and had continued under Soviet. control. BLAKE was 
privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning 
stages. BLAKE stated that he had informed. his Soviet contact 
of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was. 


made on its location in the latter part. of 1953. The 


23 
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question then arises. as to why the Soviets permitted the 
tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly. one year. Many 
theories have been advanced, but it is most probable that 
we will never know the exact ‘rationale behind the. Soviet 


moves. 


24 


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The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating 


the project: 


a. Three cables were. tapped. They contained 273 
metallic pairs. capable of transmitting a total of approx- 
imately. 1200 communications chanhels. The maximum number 
of channels in use. at any one time approximated 500. On 
the average 28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits 
were recorded continuously. Approximately 50,000 reeis 
of magnetic tape were used — some 25 tons. 

b.. The London! processing: center employed a peak 
number of 317 persons. Twenty thousand. Soviet two-hour 
voice yveels containing 368,000 conversations were fully. 
transcribed. In addition; 13,500 German two-hour voice 


reels were received and 5,500 reels containing 75,000 


conversations were processed. Seventeen thousand of 


these conversations. were fully transcribed. 

ec. The Washington center employed 350 people at 
its peak. Eighteen thousand six-hour Soviet teletype 
yeelts and. 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels were 
conpletely transeribed. It should be borne in mind 
that many of these reels contained as many as 18 
separate circuits, some of which utilized time-division 
multiplex to create additional circuits.. The potential 
of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately 


216 hours of teletype messages. Both plain text and 


23: 
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encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was 
about 4,000 feet of teletype messages, Printed in book 

‘form, these messages. would have filled a space ten feet 
wide, 15 feet long, and eight feet high. 

d. A smail processing unit (two to four persons) 
was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot 
monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of 
the project and scanning of the more productive circuits 
for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient 
value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington 


and London were produced. 


e. Processing of the backlogged material con- 
tinued tatil 30 September 1958 and resulted. in a total 
of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages or 
conversations. 

| _ £, The total cost of the project was $6,700,000. 

The information from this material was disseminated in 
a. closely controlled system called “REGAL."" Appendix B. 
consists of a summary of the value. of the material received 
together with typical customer comments. Despite our knowl- 
edge of the fact that. certain elements of the Soviet. Govern= 
ment were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no 
° evidence that the Soviets. attempted to feed us dgception | 
material through this source. 
26 
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<<.5 °° °° ~ 


Vi. AFTERMATH 


As previously noted, considerable thougiit was given 
during the entire life of. the project -on the result its 
discovery would bring. in retrospect it is probably. correct 
to say that, among those most. actively concerned with the 
project's management, ‘a consensus ‘developed that the Soviets 
would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel’ S existence 
rather: than ‘admit to the world that Free ‘world “intelligence 
organs had the capability ‘of successfully ‘mount ing an ORErS = 

°. tion of this magnitude. In. othér words, it. was. felt that for 


the Soviets to admit. that the U.S. had been reading theiy high 


level communications. circuits would cause the Soviets to lose. 
face. Perhaps fortunately, -fate intervened, and as 2 possible. 
consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly. contrary 
to expectation. | 
The Commandant. of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would | 
normally have controlled the handling of the situation when 
the tunnel was discovered,’ was absent from Berlin. and the | 
Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was in charge. 3 
There is some reason to. believe that: he (for whatever reason) 
was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action 
without benexit ial advice fron Moscow. At any rate his : 


reaction cae unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin 


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and unconcealed delight to this indication that the 
U.S., almost universally regarded a5 a stumbling neophyte 
in espionage matters, was. capable of a coup against the 
Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master 
in such. matters. 

gz. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessi- 
tated such measures, thoughtful editorial. comment 
applauded this indication that the U.S. was capable of 
fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the 
struggle. 
Appendix € contains a. sampling of typical U.S. press 


accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably 


the Communist press treated the turinel as an cutrage and an 


98 
—§-B-C Rh ET 


2 
‘ ; 
-§-E—C-k-E-T— 
press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its 
facilities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most ! 
highly publicized peacetime: espionage enterprise in modern 

times prior to the "U-2 incident." Worldwide reaction was out- 
standingly favorable. in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige. | 
Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as foilows: | 
a. There was universal admiration (and this. : 
included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence | : 
of the installation ang the imaginative nature of the | 
‘undertaking. | | 
b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise 
| 


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intolerable indecency. Appendix D consista of a study of 
East German press reaction to the incident. 
For their contributions to Project ee 


were made. to the following individuals: — 


CR Siaute Distinguished Intelligence Medal 
Intelligence Medal of Merit. 
intelligence Medal of Merit 
Intelligence Medal of Merit : 

Mr. William K, Harvey Distinguished Intelligence Medal | 

_ CIA Statute 


Intelligence Medal of Merit 
Intelligence Medal of Merit 
Distinguished Intelligence Medal i 


Intelligence Medal of Merit 


After the project went. into the production phase it was 


necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize 
the product. In all almost 1500 U.S. personnel were cleared 
for the project, in addition to a very large number of British 


atthe Vidindindey the writer has been unable to locate an 
exact record of those persons who received other recognition 
from the Agency for their participation in this project and 
any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that 
approximately 1000 people participated wittingly or unwittingly 
in this undertaking. In fact thereare very few, if any, of the 
elements of CIA that. vere not called upon for assistance, either 
directly or indirectly (such as providing manpower), during 
the life of the project. 


29 


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Subjects. With the exception of BLAKE (as noted above), we 
have no indication that there was a single security leak 
during the life of the project. It is also interesting to 
note that compartmentation was good enough, even at the 


Berlin site, that a number of individuals actively engaged 


in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact 


source until they read about it in the press. 


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APPENDIX A 


NOTE: This assessnent was. prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff 
immediately after the discovery: of the tunnel and is based 
on: pertinent information available. At the time the report 
was prepared BLAKE's. activities had not been surfaced. | 


15 August 1956 


_ DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF PBJOINTLY 


Analysis of all available évidence - traffic passing on 


“the target. cables, conversations recorded from a microphone 


instalied in. the tap chamber ; and vital obgervaticnes From the 
site - indicates that. the Soviet discovery of DRIOINTLY was 
purely fortuitous and was not the reault of a penetration of 
the U.S. or U.K, agencies. concerned, a security violation, ‘or 


testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. A descrip- 


‘tion of the events. Ieading to these conclusions is contained 


in this paper. 

Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of tele-. 
phone and telegraph: cables were £Looded and began to fault 
between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 1956.. 
The first major fault was discovered on cable FK 151 at 
Wassmannsdorf on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting 
the defective stretch of cable and replacing a’ 3000 meter 
length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22 


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‘April, when the tap was discovered, cables 150, 151, 153, and 


157 were inoperative at various times. During this ‘pertod 
Soviet signal troops and East German Dost and. Telegraph tech- 
nicians' woxked frantically to re-establish. and maintain con- 
ftunications.- Télephone lines serving Marshal Grechko, the 
Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces. Germany (GSFG) , and 
General Kosyakin, Malyi, Tsarenko, and Dudakov failed, tempo- 
rarily depriving these officers. of communications. Faults on, 
cable FK.150 put the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out 
of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning 
Control. Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications. 
German technicians began a testing program based at. 
Karlgshorst. and ‘Mahlow and working north from Mahlow, A. major 
fault on FK 150 was. discovered and repaired at Wassmannédort 
on 18-19 April, and on 19 April a second major fault on the 
same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers 
south of the tap site. Jt appears that. the faulty section.of 
cable was replaced with a. new stretch during the -earlby hours 
of 20 April, but communications remained unsatisfactory, par= 


ticularly on FK 150° , ang the testing and repair program 


" FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern 


from the. day that the cables were reached. It was: ‘physically 


in very poor shape, with brittle and cracking insulation. The 
actual tap of FK 150 was. delayed: almost three months in. 
deference to ata poor physical condition. 

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continued, This general situation was noted -by personnel at. 
the site who checked the tap on the morning of 19: April and 
found it to be in good condition with no faults present. 
Berlin. notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of 
20 April, noting, “available precautions taken including. 
primary one of crossing: fingers." 

Throughout 20 April Soviet-operators at Karlshorst, the. 
Mahlow cable. chamber, and Zossen/Wuensdorf checked FK 150 pairs 
carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made 
Switches where necessary or-possible. Nothing was said con- 
cerning the testing being.conducted to discover the faults or 
work bieing done by a Soviet. labor force Lent to the Gexmans 
to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On 21 April 
a Karlshorst technician told a. colleague. in Zossen /Wuensdorf 
the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days’ 
work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble. 
Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped ‘up during the 
evening of 21 April, and the Soviets showed considerable con- 


cern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning’ telegraph 


channel which had been transferred to FK 150 on 17 April. Lt. 


Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf, 


telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center, 


at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air 
Warning circuit, They agreéd that commutiications had to be 
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established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty 
Station, 

There is no significant information available on ‘the 
actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from . 
0300 hours on. 20 April to 0050 hours: on 22 April. On. the basis. 
of available information, however, it seems probable: that ta) 
the testing program continued north until a fault. was located 
near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire 
section of cable which émbraced the tap site; or (b) the re- 
peated faulting coupled with the age .and physical condition. of. 
FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only 


effective remedy was to. replace the cable, section by section, 


and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our 
-gite and continued northward until the tap was discovered. 

At approximately 0050: hours on 22 April, 40 or 50 men 
were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed 
along the entire area observable from our installation,, 
digging at three to five foot intervals over the location. of 
the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At approximately 
0200 hours the top of the tap chamber w2s discovered, and at 
0210. Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap 
chamber, The first fragments of speech indicated that the dis- 
covery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among: those 


present. A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof 


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. permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a 
Soviet adoeaiu? wae brought to the spot. After some discus— 
‘sion. all agreed that. the discovery was 4 manhole covering a 
repeater point, and the working crew ‘began enlarging the hole 
to gain access to the ®repeater point." 

' While. the working party was uncovering the tap chamber, 
Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the communi~ 
cations situation in a rambling telephone conversation at 
approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at. the res- 
toration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow, and Vyunik. 


went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on 


FK 150. In. context it appears that this suspicion was 
directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up. the. diffi-. 
culties on FK 150: once and for all. In ‘any event, Alpatov 
clearly did not share his colieague's doubts. The general 
tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely. 
in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom 
we know well. ‘The conversation appears to be a clear indi- 
cation that, ‘as of 0230 hours on 22 April, neither of. these 


responsible officers was aware of the existence of the. tap. 


2/ presumably Captain Bartash, an enginecr who later 
received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the 
discovery of the tap. 


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Weanwhile back at the sité the work of enlarging a hole 
to give full access to the tap chamber continued. At approxi- 
mately 0250 hoirs an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on 
the scene, presumably in response to a request ‘for eee 
by the working party. The ‘Colonel did not appear to be 2 


Signal officer erage ‘he took no active part in the investiga- 


tion and remained on the ‘scene only for a short tinie. - Having 


‘enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for 
the first time the cables and the era door on. the floor of 
the chamber. They “assumed the trap door to be "some sort of 
box’ and had to suspicion of: the true. nature of the ‘installa- 
tion. At approximately. 0300 noure- barriers were erected to 
keep inquisitive Onlookeys ‘away from the excavation and it 
was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate, 
presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same. time 
the first German voice was ‘heard, in conversation with @ 
German-speaking Russian, The German stated that two trucks 
must nae ond the spot without eee it. The Russian 
that they must wait “until morning” for the decision as to 
what: further work would be undértaken. 

While these developments were taking place, Vyunik held 
a.telecon ‘with the Aix Warning Center in Moscow in. which he 


yeferred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center ‘and. 


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discussed, in detail, communication arrangements nécessi- 
tated by this move, This revealing. teleconference tends to 
Support other evidence indicating that. as of 0300 hours the 
true nature of the installation nad still not been established. 
The work of excavation continued, and fragments of con- 
yversation connected: with it were picked up by the tap chamber 
microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that. "some- 


body. has come from there and there are fewer workers there,” 


suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point. 


The Russian gave instructions: that’ nothing in the installation 


-was to be touched. <A German remarked that the chamber might 


be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the 
sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities. 
The Russian answered that they already had this information 
and that the. plans: showed "that chamber" to be 120 meters 
away from this point. At about 0320 hours, when still more 
of the tap chamber was revealed and a better view of the ‘in-. 
terior obtained, those present began to speculate vaguely 
about its exact nature and the time of its construction. One 


of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might 


‘have. been built during the war, possibly for "Vhe Che" (Russian 


abbreviation. for "high. frequency transmission," but used. Loose- 
ly to denote anything connected with. secure communications. ) 
Shortly after 0330 hours, the. Soviets left the. site by motor 
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vehicle, presumably to report their findings. For approxi-. 
mately one and one-half hours: - from 0330 ‘to 0500. ~ 10 
sounds or voices were recorded « 

At approximately /0419. hours. _Vyunik telephoned Alpatov’ Ss 
apartment in..Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken : 
with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov 
said that he had, that he was. getting dressed, and that he 
would go: to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik 
told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame roon at 
Zossen/Wuensdort , adding, "When we speak we must do so care- 
fully. We know what the matter is, so we will speak care- 


fully." This indicated clearly that. by 0415 hours. the GSFG 


Signal Directorate and General Dudakov, the. Chief Signal 

Officer, had been inforsied. of the discovery of the PBJOINTLY 

chamber, viewed it with extreme suspicion, and planned to re- 

route circuits passing, over the target cables. This. coincides ; i 

neatly with ttie departure fron: the tap site of: the Soviets at 

0330. At 0630 Yyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst 

Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel. Zolochko, 

Deputy Chief of the Lines’ Department, GSFG, had left Wuensdorf 

at 0625 to go “there.” Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added 

‘that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do. was to ‘sit 

and wait. | | 
In due course Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site, 


accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the 


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Commander of the working party, By this time the Soviets 
apparentiy had brought circuit. diagrams to the site and were 


aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables.. There 


was considerable discussion of the discovery, and oné of the 


erew actually. entered the chatiber and made a superficial and 
inconclusive examination, Shortly. afterwards the statement, 


"the cable is tapped," was made for the first time on the 


At about this. time (0635 hours) Lt. Colonel Vyunik tele- 
phoned Major Alpatoy and asked whether he had received the. 
"task" and whether. its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied 
that he had received and understood the assignmerit. Speaking 
in. unusually vague terms, Vyunik instricted Alpatov to take 


over two. low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the 


KGB signals organization. (These channels. would provide tele- 


phone, communications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead 


line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that 
they could continue necessary technical discussions on the 
new facilities. 


Although teletype traffic continued until the tap. wires 


were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon ~— the last tele-. 


phone call of any interest was placed sometime between 08006 
and 0900 hours on. 22 April, when an agitated General speaking 
from Marshal Grechko’s apartment attempted to contact Coionel 
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Kotsytuba, who was then acting for General Dibroya, Berlin” 
Commandant, Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to 
Coionel Pomozanovskii, Chief of Start of the Berlin Garrison, 
atressing the urgency of his call. Pomozanovakii promised to: 
find Kotsyuba at once. and get hin. to return the call. The 
return call was not intercepted, but there appears to. be no. 
doubt. that Marshal. Gréchko had by this time been informed of 
the. discovery and wished to discuss. it. with Colonel Kotsyuba., | 
A Tew telephorie calls were attempted after. this, but the oper- 
ators refused to place the calls, and in one case a Karlshorst 
operator said, "I won't put you through to anyone. Don't ring, 
that's. all. I won't answer you any more. It's in the order," 
Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet 
officers arrived at the excavation, including ‘Colonel Gusev 
of the KGB. Signals Regiment. A Rissiah-speaking German was 


heard to remark that a "commission" was expected, and a Soviet 


officer said that they would await the arrival of. this commis-~ 


Sion before making a decision as to what the next step would 


be. In answer to a question as. to whether anything should be 


disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing Should be 


done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added, 


however, that the hole providing access to thé chamber should 
be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out. 


The. .general discussion. continued, and the possibility of some 


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form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was. ‘discussed at | 
some length. There. was widespread belief that the trap door, 
which in fact. provided access to the. tunnel. proper, was &@ "box" 
or "battery box” possibly involving a booby trap. ‘Oné of the 
Soviet. officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after every- 
thing liad been careers noted and recorded, a grappling iron 


could be attached to the thox" in order toa tear it away. MIE 


A . ed . 


there is no explésion;" he said, "then we can calmly go ahead 
and deal With it.” | 

Several. individuals, presumably. German cable splicers, 
agreed that the cabies were fully ‘tapped and discussed the 
method employed. They agreed Pints it must have been done in: 


such a way as to. render the tap undetectable by measurements, 
although one of them failed. to understand why the actual cut— 
ting of the cables was not detected. He added that at that: 
time “everyone must. have been quite drunk.” ‘The Germans. con- | 
tinued to speculate on the nature of the "box" and about the 
means of: access to the tap chamber. One of them said, "They 
themselves must have some means of entering this. place, but. 
naturally it's highly improbable that they have cénstructed 
a passage for getting from here to there!" 

Some of those: present apparently believed that the tap 
was. an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults 


on the cable. During this discussion the microphone was 


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—5-5-¢- 2-2-2 


C06828875 


twice noted, but was not recognized for what it was. In the 
first: instance the speaker said; "That, is not a microphone," 
and in the second it was described as “a black bail." 

The. general discussion continued, with speculation as to 
the nature of the thattery. box". and with several comments that 
it should be possible to identify the tappers "from the make 
of the materials" and the techniques employed. While the Ger- 
mans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the 
Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical 
experts and administrative representatives would carry out 
their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable 
as "not ours," indicating that after the inspection they planned 
to disconnect the lead-off cable and to "check how far it goes 
from here - probably by means of electrical measurements, It 
is evident that at this tine (approximately 1130 hours) the 
Soviets and Germans were still unaware. of the existence of the 
tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or those re- 
‘sponsible for the tap. 

At: approximately’ 1145 hours one of the German crew. was: 
heard ‘to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a shaft!" 

From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seen 
that a small hole kad. been made near the still-intact trap. 
door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but 


continued to work at and around it despite the alternate 


12- 


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Suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until 

we reach the cable or the shaft." By approximately 1230 

they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of 

the tap chamber. The padlock which secured the trap door from 


below was examined and was identified as “of English origin.” 


‘Failing to open the door separating. the tap chamber from the 


equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximately twenty min- 


utes; broke. a hole through the wall and gained visual. access 


to the equipment chamber, which they described as "a long. 
passage."' By 3300 they evidently had enlarged the access Hole 
aiid described “a completed installation - a telephone exchange., 
:.... An installation for listening in /Abhoeranlage/,"' 
Additional motion pictures’ were made and frequent excla- 
mations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet 
Colonel, probably Zolochko; a person addressed as Nikolai 
{vanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a Captain, presumably 


Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used 


by the tappers in gaining access to the cables, Zolochko 


evidently still believed that this was done "from above." 


Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German: commis- 


sion, mentioned earlier, had already visited the site and 


established the nature of the installation without going into 


technical details. 


13 


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Measurements. of parts. of the interior were then taken, 
discussion of the installation became general, and the partici- 


pants clearly tndicated that the means of ‘access and full impli- 


cations of the operation were finally appreciated, ‘ Converadtions 


reflected that all present realized ‘that the planning of the 
tunnel approach to the cables. ‘must have. necessitated a very 
detailed study of relevant naps and plans.” The. stress to which 
the roof of the. chambers would be subjected and. the: necessity 
of preparing the. lead-off cables beforehand were’ mentioned, 

and e Caechneae joard to exclaim, “It must have cost a pretty 
penny." A Russian-speaking German added ;. admiringly; "How 
neatly and tidily they Have done it.” It was decided that 


work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day 


when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise, 


whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between 
one and ‘two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight." 
One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed, "What 2 
filthy trick. And where you would least expect it.” -- to 
which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for: oneself, 
nobody would believe it.” 
Between 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut, and 
at about 1545 ‘the attention of the Germans. began to concentrate 
on the microphone itself. One of them assumed it to. be an. 


‘alarm device - probably a microphone," to give warning of 


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approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be 
photographed, At 1550 hours work began:-on dismantling 
‘the. microphone. Shortiy afterward the microphone went 
dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational. 


phase of PBJOINTLY was completed, 


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APPENDIX B.. 


RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED | 


Set forth below..are a recapitulation of intelligence 
derived from the REGAL material and some typical. consumer 


comments ,. 


GENERAL | 
The REGAL operation provided the United States and the 
British with @ unique. source of current intelligence. on the 


Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been avail- 


able since 1948. Responsible U.S. and British officials. con- 


sidered PBJOINTLY, during its productive phase, to’ be the 
prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in 
Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items 
of intelligence. for which REGAL was either a unique or most 


timely and reliable source. 


POLITICAL 


Throughout the life of source (11 May 1955 - 22 April 


1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in 


Berlin; REGAL provided the inside story of every “incident” 


occurring in Berlin during the periog-- a story which was in 


°. 
° 
. 
i ° 
ry b ° . 
. 


oat eee 


C06828875 


each case considerably at variance. with accounts of ‘the same 
incident as reported. by other sources, REGAL showed that, 
contrary to estimates by other sources; the Soviets at that 
tine did not intend to relinquish their ‘prerogatives vis-a-_ 
vis the other. ‘three occupy ing ‘powers despite continually | 
increasing pressure from the Fast Germans to assert thear Sov- 
ereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of Kast Germany. 
REGAL provided -a clear picturé. of the unpreparedness, confusion, 
and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever 

| an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one 
of the Western powers. 


The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an 


Hast German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1955, ‘in 
time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers 
Conference in Genéva to that effect. | 
REGAL . provided a detailed account of the Soviet. prograni 
for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party: Congress, 
including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear 
scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the 
new. theory of collective leadership and the detigration of 
Stalin, | 
7 The progress of ‘Marstial Zhukov's attempt to curtail the 
influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces 
(which led to: his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL " 


9 3 
—s-2-€-2-E-7— 


at teatite An wy SPE PEP. 80 0 COST RLI IOI COLA DLO ci Cll Lt SPE FOO ICID ITO SITIOS SLA AAA VIN MS GS ORG CONE 8 2 SO NID ERI AP sore Patera iAP EOF TTT IPI lic COLE BY WP VOTING LITT FUT POTD PIRES CDA EOL IIE FOPSII PAIGE APE IS 5 99hOO SS OTERE OF 6tA Ne Pe Ohne meee meaty OMe 0 ten 8: Pam 8 mg = 90 TUE AE eine ns 0S RED 2 ED SD SFG NS OR DCE ELS SOs Creeeress sss 6 


——— i no one inoses 


C06828875. 


material from the aiitumn of: 1955 to mid-April 1956. 

REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relation- 
ships between various key military and political figures of 
the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and 


od oe . 
the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland. 


MILITARY 
General | 
a. Reorganization o£ the Soviet Ministry of 
Defense. | 
b. Soviet plans to implement. the Warsaw Pact by 


increasing Soviet-Satellite military coordination. 


¢. Implementation of the publicity announced 
intention to vedice the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, 
d. Identification of several thousand Soviet 
' officer-personnel. 
Air | 
&@. Development of an improved nuclear delivery 
capability in the Soviet Air Army in East Germany. 
b. Re-equipment. of the Soviet Air Army in East 
Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors 
having an airborne radar capability. 
¢. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in 
Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division. 


CO6828875. 


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d. Identification and location of approximately 
100 Soviet Aix Force installations in the USSR, East 
Germany , and Poland, ineluding a number. of key. wircraft 
factories. | : 
' Ground Forces . ; . 

a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces. within 
the USSR not previously identified or not, located for 
several years by any other source. 

b. -Soviet training plans for the spring and early. 
summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland. 

c, Identification of several thousand Soviet field 


post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of 


battle intelligence). 
Navy 

a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength. 
of the Soviet Naval: Forces.. 

b. Organization and. administrative procedures of 
‘the Headquarters: of the Soviet. Baltic Fleet and Soviet 


Nayal Bases on the Baltic Coast. 


| | SCIENTIFIC 
| Identification. of several. hundred personalities associ- .- 
ated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program. 

Association of certain locations in one USSR with AE 


activities. 


eA We £00 SOF FES SITS OTT PVC i eA OAD ATI I PLD CPP TOG gD Paci Lele + nl DIYS OLR ED VOD 8 CPI: PPD PNA ay TRITON T Pas Caan IN I, IOFOTO TTR Ratatat iD fa UP TTI So TIS FATTO t YS, POE 8 ISS HAS beees > Ps Fees went cecmrmnme Onn PUES BUVAL FEED ol Mel ohm oe OEE I SERIES IR Oe t AA AGS OR Re VY OPA TS Oe DF 2 Pes es ce 


‘CQ6828875. 


-S-E-C-R-E-F- 


Organization and activities of. Wismuth SDAG (mining 


‘uranium in the Aue area of East Germany). 


OPERATIONAL 

Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet 
Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of 
‘several hundred Soviet intelligence pevecnnlitica in. Bast 


Germany and. Moscow, 


TYPICAL CONSUMER COMMENTS. 


March .1956 
ACSI /Ariny - "REGAL has provided unique and highly 


valuable current information on the ordex of battle, 
training, Groanteation: equipment, and operations of the 
Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the 
scope and variety of the types of information found in 
REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early 
warning of Soviet attack.” 

ACSI/Air = "The numerous productions received from — 
the REGAL project have been an extremely. valuable con- 
‘tribution to the Intelligence Comminity in our common 
, probiems...” 

7 February 1958: 
CIA/OSI - "REGAL ‘has provided valuable information 


on atomic. energy activities in East Germany, including. 


&. 
—_S-2-C-h-2 


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“—§-E-¢-2-5-2- 


organizational relationships, personalities, procurement 
details, and uranium ore shipmerit data, The number. of 
hitherto unknown atomic energy localities, personalities, 
and activities disclosed in REGAL traffic is impressive." 
CIA/ORR - “in refexvenced memorandum we indicated our 
great interest in Zinanciail material of all kinds which 
Was availiable. in REGAL material, ‘Thanks: to your coopera— 


tion ve are exploiting the material with great success,". 


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APPENDIX C_ 


TYPICAL AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT 


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A. - WASHINGTON POST 
1 May 1956 


The Tune of Love. 


Tho United Slates‘Coverument has not yet nada 
Any official repty to the. Soviet and East German 
allegations and: protesls concerning the 300-yard 


tunel (ist Ameyican Inleligenca -oparatives are , 
said to have-buill undérneath, the. border between 7 


‘West and East. Berlin for espionage purposes. 
Meanwhile, assuming the story to be correct-—-we 
cannot help thinking the Commuaisis have made 
a grievous mistake 10 raise 50 much fuss about their 
‘discovery. They are even said to have conducted 
‘special propatanta tours through “the tuancl -and 
10 have exhibited the wiretapping and other record- 
‘Gng apparatus that the Americans-.are supposcd. to 
have installed inside it: 

The probable result.of all this has been to give 
the anti-Communist resistance in Hast Germany a 
good deal of amusement. and encouragement. Cer- 
tainly it must Nave ‘served to- strehgthen the -im- 
“pression. of American, resourcefulness and therehy 
‘ta restora: somo micasure of our prestige—which 
apparently: had been deteriorating sinee ihe equiva- 

cal attitude taken. by the American authorilies in 
ihe East German uprisings.of June, 1954—among 
“the captiva. population. The reaction of their 
kinsmen in ‘West Germany is ea a prelty ‘ : 
good index to.their own, ‘i 
In West Germany the slory has been accepted 
at face value wilh astonishment and delighl.as an 
éevidenes.that tha tradition of Yankes résource- 
fulness and ingenuity is not a myth afer all. 
Espionage Is one game jn which the Communists. 
ot were Geemed, even by their encinics, to be: par- 2 
ticularly expert and ‘our own side to. be dismally ; 
inept. Very few Germans, as the . Fraikfurter : 
Neue Presse -oxullantly observed, even’ suspected. 
ihat tha Aniericans “were capable of so much . 
cleverness"; and it would be even more devastating 
7 to ‘Communist prestige if it wera disclosed (hat. | a 
ae tha espionage tinnel had been’ in operation for 
sania time-befora the Communists became aware: 
of it. 
‘Indeed, if the tunne) episode turns out to have. 
heen the: product of Yankee ingenuily, there. Js an: 
cae: interesting patallel in American history, During 
fhe siege of Petersburg jn 1064, an enterprising 
Union ‘officer from the. Pennsylvania . coal fields 
conceived the idea, of: mining the Confederate 
positions from a tunnel..under (hem. The tunnel 
was dug. and the niines werd finally’ set-off; and 
j though the operation was a fiasco in part because” 
’ of the: failure of Usion commanders: to execule 
‘orders, the boldness.of. tha slroke, has. compelled 
— ‘ever. since, © ts? +, ee ‘ 
Soa, (SE : 


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BERLIN 
Wonderful Tunnel 

Belin, city of rubble, refugees, ‘aatl 
occasional preteltiss of glitter, is tin Alfred 
Jiitehenck. dream of subterfuge aart suspi- 
‘cioa, In hack. streels, darkly mysterious’ 
houses hurk behind high wire fences: sug- 
Restive of darker and ‘mare mysterious 
lodge within. Newaen recently caurted 
37 separate..agécnen’s af. Wear iutcili- 
gence known to ‘be at work in: Berlin. 


fashionably 


Their —_ojteratives-—some 
Manlison Avenue, some with armpit hole 
stars bulging’ wader hie serge—report to 

scliiteriut Readquiiriers. and varely {Know 
~ what their collegues are up ta. 

Msi stl Perlin dhere’ is no spot better 
sulted) is alee Hiteheck schema (rings: 
thay a-riatic, semineyerte:] comer. knee 
on the U.S. side an Kastow and ‘in the 
Russian zone, just aver the way, as Alt- 
GHenicke. -Selfsimportant.. ducks and 
chickens strat like ‘commiissars in AR 
CHienirke's ‘cabled stfect . Uerlin’s any 
warking windmill fords lazily in the 
heveze near ly, and close fo, the hourly 
Separating East and West stands a U:S: 
radar sitting, bending its reviculas ter ta 
the. upesations at East Betlio’s. hisy 
‘Schdneteld Airport. “Pwo rings of buried 
‘Wire jaavd Use lonely tadar post, and . 


. 


> oe o 


-@ 


and igolated-as monks, °-.. 


= 


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0 oe EOS! ai eoR CAO EE. “00 


‘ee 


TIME MAGAZINE 
7 May 1956 ° - : 


Tho Big Colley. For many 2 month, 
‘the’ supsrscerecy sucrounding the can-. 
‘struction aiid operation: 6f Rudow's radar * 
‘station had fed the gossije af bored Amer: 
icans in the eecupied city. “Fhese were 


(- those who remembered a-civilian engineer 
Slotheil inthe grey inne! of New York's: ured to supervise. the job; he had quit ia 


‘disgust -because the blueprints svemed so. 

crazy. “Why build a cellar ‘big. enough: ta 

(lcive through with a-dump truck?’ he 

- asked. and was told to ining ‘his.own busi- 
ness, Others recalled scempg friends whom 
they knew to he engineers suddeniy aj- 
peating at We station wearing the insignia 
of the U.S. Anny Signal Cur. Why? An 
aniused shrug. was the only ansiver gues- 
tioners-ever got—hin lael week ihe Rus-- 
sians dhought they had found a better one. 
- One. night at. 7 o'clock, “an angry, 

| ghunky Soviet celuticl uimed ‘Ivan Kolsic— 

, Uba catled a press conference in East Beve ' 


I" lin, Purpose: to provest the Building by~ 

r “American osganizations” af -a: secret 
sunncl.unader Kast Cierman‘tescitary. “with 
the ¢rininal intent of spying.” -Olfercd x 


4 chance to sco i ees the Wester 
eo og . ; e, : ‘_ Newsyren were . ; e . a e 
Signal Corps. men five a life as secret," " : 


Peed ees f 


40) w. 


yards from the radag station at Rudow. 


eve 60 nin ewte gy vane mtr a= spre Ke 


a® 


A Lot of Money: Truckloads of Red 
army troops and squad cars crowded with 
Volkspaliees staml by, Mahile generators: 


7 were hing to provinle:- lights far the 


wale te yi ad beedue ara wee We 6 SO Ketone ae a 
b o fe Sg : . 


OE OS ee YG OO EIN FEU AWE” 2? Serr ese eo. . 


ane d'04 


cveasion, ndoad Ute. etitésine (af hale 
dling te the gemuned.a cole ofthe Bie 
| shur-signal carps iwas-of lapd da explain it 
ald. ‘Fen ives below, its cutranve a Teity vat 
; in the roof by the Russians, lay the: tunel 
‘itself: a cast-iron tube about six feet 
ijn diamcier atid seo-Geo yards long, 
\ eranimed ‘with electeonic edsiipmienl, ¢n- 
bles. tape securders, ventikating apporsivs 
and pumps of bath Svitish dud Antericas. 
make. Al Wie Exast-Gerguan ened. cables led 
gut of the main bndy of the tunel to a: 
separate chamber where: Lhey were liked 
to two Kast German cables aud a ubied 
used hy the Russians, What-was at the 
Awefican. ends The newsmen were net 
permitted lo Rudw. As they crawled west- 
Ward. ss sandlig:beerrien barrel the way, 
ils purpasy emphasized by a. sign reads 
ine Maijglish cau German; "Vou are naw 
entering (he Amerisiuy sector” 

“This tunnel,” said the Russiay expert, 
with a note of admiration, “was wile 16 
lust séary. “Phe parly respensilde must. 
have hud’ low af maaey." 

Wii .was responsibies Nalaly, neither 
the Bentayan.. the Siste Depmirtinent, mee. 

.. the Central Lntelligence Agency, Was soy- 
. ing. But :as Hertin’s’ pnjiers erapled glee 
| fully with the news, oie Kerlin editor told 
; 


@ a ¢e to 


2 08 oe Sam etter Se 28 04 


a sanking U.S. official: “& don't know 
‘whether your people dug that wanderful: 
; cunnel er not, but whoever it was, let me 
} gay Lthink it was too bad it was found 
. It's the best publicity the U.S. has had in. 
. Berlin for.a long tinie.” *. 


.7 8 *e. 


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> + eet ,. - - a, x. Us ae baled 
. Hope lt Is True’ +" 
Soviet’ me that American intelligence “agents: 
dug a tunnel in Eerlin, tapped. a telephone cable, and; 
| recorded conversations-over the Red communication net-' 
iwork, which the Reds, made with considerable-fanfare. 
‘and duting'3 conducted: tour of the spy tunnel for cor-, 
a gives us some: faint hope. 4 
Frankly, we didn't know that American intelligence 
agents were that.smart. : In- fact, we were beginning” 
{think that, what it the Central Intelligence Agency necded’ 


[WEES TE TCS on the asaamentels 8 "ot espionage on 


“We : tape “that American | as agents have’ 
MAL, ‘the Soviet..department of foreign -affairs,' 
iplanted western"sympathizers in the Heart-of the. Sovietl 
- bureaucracy. and started a stream of microfilmed copies’ 


jof important ie ceenearemamard | 


‘Washin e ; 
Soe be: ‘ail this because that is precisely what. the 
‘Soviet. spy network ‘did and is probably doing right. now: 


tin the United States. ‘This is not just tit for tat—butsa, 
istaric necessity in ‘the world of cynical power SS ad 


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: ae : Pege Fe Hs r aii ; 
t. ; Ne EN a 50 
Piss gree Well Spent /z 2 § 
ce coe | There is-only one agency in 
Pee aa Seo ington which does not. accountt wien} 
ee os 5 money it spends. The Central. Intelll- 
nt BONS ilgenee Agency, headed by Allen W. a 2 . 
ee a * oo tDuiles, has never reported to Con- . 
ae ae Hgress, A special committee, appointed ; :. 
eee iby: the President, did make"a survey . 
are Jof the agency's activities and Was ap- e 
a eee | parently satisiied that ib was efficient. . 
Pot 480. scarey are the netivities of . this}. : 
he ‘‘geréup that even the amount ‘ of - 
a eek +money it. spends Is unknown, Ac- . 
Sane ee dcountants -have estimated that there | 
ae jis roughly $2.*billion in budgets of . : 
de eee other departments which, is diverted :* 
ae eee tothe CIA: — 
ae } Naturally enough,. Congress. worries} ¢ 
rk oe. from. time to: time that this money} 
a Pe 2 may-not be well'spent. Last weék some] . 
wt Laer sth snews came out of Berlin which should 
“Hyp ped jealm such, fears: : 
pet : The Russians discovered that their 
wb 4 dthree main. telephone: cables from} 
rs i7-~. | Bast Berlin to polite cast were tapped.| 
ae, aes ; C) A tunnel from the Western zone, con- 
ae at nected ‘with the tapped ines and 
ok wires, led to Sandbags dt the zone 
ab tg boundary. The Russians ‘were greatly} 
~ 2 -% disturbed. ‘They claim that all mes- * 
ay sages for several] years have. pceen ine 
gag tercepted, They blame this violation? 
doo of privacy on American intelligence. . : 
eae res ous officials. have expressed horror 
2 ne = t the charge, They. haven’t,’they say, f 
ee ee ae = tthe slightest Idea ‘of where the nest: 2 
eT ae ar lead or by’ whom: they were.laid.. The r 
. vce’ Russians. are. just old. meanies to elatm: ) 
ae we wire-tapped. : 
wee \ West Berliners are laughing, Good’ : 
oe Ves for American Intelligence, they say.}: 
POM dt {They hope, and so do. we, that chet "e : 
ug ont! Russians have only discovered one off ~ 
ey ahs scveral’ taps. At least, the exposal ; 
a shows that some. of.the- money. spent , ie 
” ate by CLA’ may rst been very well spent : 
- .. : ra : a indeed, »/ CNS voit ., ey oe ‘ wa eg Gias 4a 
‘ So 
ve “ 
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APA PAPA Rati, eee a 


GOGRDBBTS 7 


“RATIONAL WAL, EROADOASTANG COAL AV Tee co Es 


OTA Mi HAVE ORDERED WERETAP TUNNEL == DRETER 0: 


Alex Dreier at 6:00 P.M. over WMAQ (Chicago) and the “Nee 
Radio. Networks: . 


' Avid now under tha heading, special réport,. part ones 
~igreat-Hnitein-waith-ibe—frogman-spy- who-burned “Out ‘tbo "be" nob. 


~so-suckéessfinl_in-his-secrotiveness—has_nobhing onus. We have a 
» ‘tunnel we dug under the communist sector of Berlin and which ths. 


feds exposed to the light of day, as you probably know, a short 
while ago.. Well, our NEC corraspondent, good friend and colleague ; 
Frank Burkholzer, has investigated the story of the wiretap tunnel ~ 
ard he: say's ‘there's. just one conclusion — it's ours. We dug it, 
we equipped it. with electronic equipment to listen in on communist 
East German conversations for a whole year before they found us cute 


“Presumably wea should. be. embarrassed but nobody in Berlin ise 

In fact, there is a bint of American and West. Garman pride in know~ 
that we pulled. off an espionage trick on the Reds for a change, 
Of course, the Bast Germans ere making a good thing. of it by con-: 
ducting tours through the tunnel. to impress ‘their people with tha 
éastardlinéss of the American spies, but that may backfire on them 
because the East Germans are not bayond getting a qitiet ‘sliuckle at - 
this outwitting of their commnist rulers. 


(Burkholzer tella us that the United States is stampad ali 
over the listening post. tunnel. Now, the tunnel is on the outskirts 
of town with our end being lecated-under a so-called experimantal 


‘radar station beside a garbage dum. it runs straight under 4 plowed ; 


field that has white. bérder marking posts above it. The Ruasians. 
have made three openings for the tourists. One is near the wiretap, 
another at. a point about 150 yards out in the field. When arrrone 
aske on American why thera isn!t any’radar at the experimental svg 
atation, the usual answer, according to Burkholzer, is, we said it . 


‘was expefimental, didn't we? Want to tale something of 174 


WNaturally the army and the. aprerrnent: in Washington aren't 
going to admit anything unless they have to. No-one tells who 
ordered ‘the eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it. or who 
did the listening and the digging, Perhaps..it was the work of a 
Jecal. Berlin outfit, just a curious bunch. of boys ¢ Or perhaps it 
was done secretly on orders direct. from the. Pentagon or the CENTRAL 
INIELLIGENCE AGENCY. Anyway, i+ was done well because it. wasn't 
discovered: for a year and now-the Russians may be wondering. how 


. mach we learned from recording all the phone talke, possibly ineludin, 


everything. that want through the switchboard of the nearby Soviet 
airfield. So thanks for the information, Frank. Burkholzer, and now 
we have a question for you. Why don't wa open a tourist entrance 
at our end of ths tunnel and cash in. on the publicity? Step up; 
ene and ali. Only a quarter. See modern espionage in electronic 
form and all underground, and: who knows? Pies You will meet an . 
occasional communist tourist." 


m...é. 


“C'06828875 


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NEW YORK. 


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' 41 
a FIERALD TRIBUNG 
t - ; - ‘ Soccer aes Low atm a . ee Pa 
i: ae ! TD. BI R a ae ae 4 , p 
¢ eS res “a i: nN Gi , "aR. . ° : 
ix |. ay | Berlin Reds Flock to See} _ 
a a a . 2 ° . ; : mn ce e FS 
“E+ °° 1S Wire-Tay TimaeP| = * 
po cao | ff SER. BAT iam 8 : ° 
i. J.S. Wire- Tap Tunnel | : 
4 : e . < i i a . a 
Pee t By-Gaston Coblentz Sandbag Barricade eS a se «2 
- . 
_ - ° ' ByWircless tothe LeraikTribéie) “We bave no fault whatsoever! Pan 
ge ” 201956. NY, Herald Tribune ine, jbo find with the techniquc,” one) 
yy Ped Pcl “BERLIN, May 26—One of aticndant said. e & 
PE a the arpatest elehts of ine eoids! 2rom) the eastern entrance, a - 
oy the greatest slats of the coklf! 7.0 ee Sm . 
. wat is-lhe “American spy tun-{Yisitor tan. eles Midd for oe tS : 
Oe ee ee 4 spare sac¢ (PETRA 190 yards past the point} * ‘ a ‘ 
2. As Ne tow Gn exhibition In 8st vicre wid tunnel eronses under! © > ‘ 
ea ‘The S0d-yard tunnel repre-|'he Sector border. Thena sands)» eg 
i? og sents a venture of extraordinary ae Biponktact Degen pee a , : 
_ 7 yee it i nudacity—tho stuff of which German: oer inane” 
OP as ? —s [thyiliey films are made. If i 3,"2. - c Sie ay = 
Dork fens dug ay American Inteli|egtiq continue ‘WeNARG PAS :* oe 
ae 2 Ronee f{orecs—and: that is thet. < ED GRE: . 
; + : ciara Gs Hone is the barricade he would emerge. 
. oie. - oehgral AssuMplon—ie 4S Nicoon at a Jow bet prominent. : 
7 £% _ SBOE example, Of thei American building “with rodor. 

ms ae (oe ' capacity for daring vnderlakings. sec uinment ‘on the. roof, Tiiei 

2 4 ag “5 : Seliiom ‘has -an intelligence fy ilding is eure ee 
2 3 i L i orzanization exccuted a mere beep ied aight bathed 
PgR. of i ISRO cand difficutt operation | re enn ccldlens, See eee ene carmen ee ee 
i wwe s  tbhan that. accomplished by thetmon warn: “Entry most mein]... complex Equipment: — 

: Oe ee. an ? ‘tunnel's diggers: the. tapping Oflronadon . eels Beyand the door is.a:-compart- 

ica ee . | 269 Communist. Jongedistanice| 4 sindy of the-area-suggestdmene seven fect long housing 
or : telephone nes yunning under-ing ooccinitiny optor tas equipment t6 maintain: certain, 

ce re ; ee a, 80 ‘possibilty other than that 

5 pees. : ground hy Berlin, The lines ap- ‘thie radar ‘oullding enclases the levels of temperature and hue 

gee tee ot ; parently included some rinsing ‘western end of the:tunnel, |Midity.. ‘The. Communists’ say! 

eRe ts r to Soviet satelite stite in Existe|° gy at jthis’ was. necessary to protect; 

eee ae + jerR Europe, as well as Soviet} _ Clay Mauled Away {delicate equipment in the other~| 

ae cea , ,Atmy circuits in Germany, = {_The-men who dug. thé tunneliwise dagk and.cold tunnel. H 
Bit, Poi gt” Snack BSE Thrives,” “~~ SSviously Jnbored under two) Finally, there 1g the complex, 

Oe ar ae a wet : “major handicaps. They had tojtapping equipment, ali of Amer't-| 

er ee & wi The. tunnel, discovered by the-work very silently to ‘avoid-de-ican or British manufactureg 

foal piste i Communists A month ano. and,tection,. and they had to -haul/This includes. eight racks of] 

: a a ee ‘ow the main: sightseeing nat-“away secretly the thousands offocestcrs to carry the tapped cor-}- 
ee) ac -traction-in Berlin, cin ba visited tons. of clay they. dug out, since! vargation back to the western| - 
ob Boas . “by making ‘a twenty-minute Dig pilgs.of earth near the sectoriend of the tunnel and alsa ta| 

. oe ae ae _ rive trom ‘the center of Berlin border waild have alerted theélhelp prevent. detection of ’ the 
tee a tothe southeast corner of the:Communists. = == = taps Ps ae: 
teen ‘city, } Apparently the excavated. There ave three power-contro} 
ae ee ee A mabile snack bar is .doing-carth was hauled away in closed lonits near two Jong racks off 

a io. thriving. business’ “near theltrcks brought inte the: radarirquipment Into: which the 259 

ee iad oo veastern enctof the tunnel, cater={building, Possibly the sameicommunist liner lead from 
O.. hae a ‘= Mhe to East, German factory|'ucKs bought in: tite. sections ofjchres main cables; Here the in- :- 
oe Rese 34 jatlekations. brought to. sce theiCorrugated ton tubing whichidividual monitoring taps ares. « 
she”. “Work ofAmerican imperiausts {ine the: tunnel, The wWimosthnade.: Along thé “opposite wall . 
Be rE, ae Afier inspecting the tunnel Scercey must have been used tolof the tunnel is-n.zow of benches 
} ‘ 5 a an « tiie factory workers record their:®¥old -stin Ing. up faca) talk, , with fluarescent lighting. overe 
ea oe i*indienation™ in’ a.visitors’ book. ts Communists estinate thatihead: “Vhe. compartment is} - 
os cae ae . [The book contains wie signn={!s part of the work took sev-dpainted o battleship gray. * f° 
Siete a tures of foreigners on both sidesj°PA) Months, acd] Considered Great Experts | 
Seta ee~ 22 of the Iron Curtain, Even af Svith the tunncl completed? oo. i endt'of the eastern) - 
a se Sudanese official ig sted, ~. [there came the Job of instaliney ee Shore in anol 
sae ee -}= The tuniel, six fect in di-{he monitoring equipment. Ap-(Comporment thove is another 
coos, * tntne id with:i ; Paréently this had to be done4Steel door.-On the eastern side 
ae y jometer and with: its rool twelve le ene es ee oe GONG ede ts annemore important iG 
Pe 7 ee feet below the surface, was dug Berens Tapa toes Bas of i fs ane-niore important item! 
‘ eg from a point 200 yards. insides Sols be lapped, hecause Hass Of _an ultras 
ae ae . [the American sceter of est his equipment had. the grimaty: wnicn: would Taee fone oe “ 
ee Berlin, It, runs eastward’ to sifisk of preventing detection of:acrivity by the ‘Communists ati oo - 
rn ar . {point 200 yards Inside the Rus-j*8e Phone taps. The mass of tne noine whore ; po ok 
ms: ne JU Y ; ne point where-their tines y 
: 2 Sian. sector. The western en-CIipment war -painstakingly¢aoced any Activity there would 
cae } [tyance lies In“ sparsely-popu-![rassed through the tunhtljave meant thnd the ¢ Rate: oS 
: 2 = Fd ‘ ; as alton two ve den . {3 a tee Le fl rb the tunnel haat: ° e ‘ 
. iy { é 1 lated iscallty called, Rudow. y c te ¥ FOOt . Ta & an ‘Been discovered ‘ eh : : 
a 2-1 Only the easter end of the/!ioused.in a apecial Dinesyeloot-| The men who did the acty i | 
ae. = erpo is open ae b-sehsiart A Hong A Gena Ab the eastern tapping must Have been ameng: | 
aes clachment’ of Communist en . eee - the great experts -in the fela | 
=. & | Teople's Police-and & communi-| This compartment bertns with’rney ‘did a? secon Sy rey 
a fyo~\ jeations expert are-on hand told thick steel door at its Western pice at work, ee AYE 
haat _( -}-:lexplate every detall, They readiiyiB’rance. On the door—one of ne Communtsts say tie 22° | 
i. 4 | jexpress ‘thelr admiration for the the tunnel’s nicest. touches cto tiation, Sosnrentiy Goo nS 
a eee J. [BNL of the project's builders,- [Witten tm Russian and Gerdyor several monte hot operated) 
. l Pe, FO - cree oh pean -ereqparey enone <"°% Iman? “En f ih dchde moaths before “8 Wast 
, 1 Phen Ne aya try forbidden by order coovered. Thera fs no exploa . 
- t. 7 aes . e? _ vee £18 Commanding General. oR At how 3 Weis detector. a 


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ME AN INS: ‘ven out 97a ar site|, ihe borders of the Germans 
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democratic: republic?” he 


mitt wal fciated Press * ‘bureau ‘chief. 

oe eer ae ie ‘vgaid "Barbed wire surrounded ihe! asked. “ 
: hi ‘Gn ; Hi ; Net Stalion. and its -permancat Fes a3 Thank You 

(#eik GI SCHAZL. type buildings. ° ° Owe answer, in halting Ger: 
Baca T — Watetted by Yanks man, explained that owner. 
~ MUTE R= Re Aji American soldiets in’ sentry! ship of the tunnel has moby 
1 ey3 : it i. Bist if 'hoxes: watehed us, thru field heen, established, But: that int: 
ee . Pa 4” elasses” as: we siuntered tol. time of “tonsion,” the right: 


ward the clearly’marked- con: ness or wrongness. depended 


ist border, down a dirt 
0 _ upon :the Side of: the fence 
Let 3 u 3. Hope ners: aad, bordering an open field: | from which the operation Was 


. Tour Eerie Bore around see earth cas 
» vated to reveal two seclionso 
BY IOUN: H. THOMPSON.” the tunnel ~lwhich tunnel” visitors were 
BERLIN, May. 20 a Across the. order, Vonos sacked’ to aad ae ioe 
i Arecican’ per Poet en today’ tok us fo, their: commander, | 2005, ot on nay Kernan 
: stéod 20 {cot anderground: ini Past men and women Waiting Britieh’ m 7 Phnmerie oe ang 
‘ the alleged “ American spy to tour. the tuntrel after watch. crs . i q gue d a to. 4i Bs 
_tunnel,” burrowed 300 ards 108 a tommunist movie of its: "> ign 


Si and peed, in “elo 2 er Peper, BEN a OP 
filaom of the American secto talements for propaganda, w 
Sits the: shoulders -of swe slight. of dirt stairs, into the. arbie. A my Handwriting? ~ 


tuineh 
Miunners: § eomunit ary Encased in. steel and eon! a ae te %6 posse the 
Our host in as ceric a set.| crete was the alleged-wire fap. ‘be Pind enougt to’ sho’ fer 
- “laboratory,” directly under‘a’ Pe mnough ad 
ting: asrwas ever devised by a| tunadl. ae 
prnystery> writer,. wis 2 jack paved road leading from Ber-. 1h ne HS 
"booted afficer of the. East lin: io the Russian air base at oe ; Z ; ro = t 
: German communist poliee, the!s Schoenfeld, The, commander; ee 
::"Yopos,”. or Volkspotize. vho. declined to.-give his. a a Te 3 
: Our tour was the third: pers ‘name, said that: 2i6. telephone 
jJines.in three big cables were i « 


is the a tga aks Me ie sh tapped. 
“the night of April 21 ‘when 
"\tlhie Russian high command: F lugrescent: lighting... illue 
‘here announced “discovery: of minated 4 a “switchboard, banks 
‘the tunnel and equipment it’ of current «boosters, ampli. 
; ‘pin ‘Was used for wire . tap| , fiers, and. cables, ALL instruc: 
ing. * 
. Since then the * spy tunnel, ons on the: equipment. svere: 
i so labeled by the Russians and | in English. Some’ items: bore! 
’ : Bast Germans, has been: yi the labels of British, or Ameri-| 
{Med by.wiore than 15,000 East}¢an.manufactureres. * = 4 
“Germian worker delegations, | ’ Reds‘Man Gus --” { 
*the Communists said: < . .) Pamps sent hot ‘and. cold: 
Germans Admire Peat.. “| water to an air conditioning? 
Situated in ling with-an ex-| Unit. Other long pipes: held! 
: perimental American army; ‘ oil or. ‘air. ‘The. funnel Wast 
- radar station . [the Russians ruade of balted sections nf ¢ore! 
“say-it is a dummy) owner-|TUgeted stccl, lined on the, .  ,- 
:ship. of -the ‘tunnel has ‘not/ Sides with sandbags, . 4 
sbeen officially admitted by|. Walking back 300.yards, we. s , 
{ihe American command, here|Tesched the east-west bérder.! - 
“or in Washington, There“behind sandbags “two! 
VYopos crouched with’ 


inced ‘the Americans, built teir’ guns-and a powerfol: 
“thie tunnel, equipfied it with: : searchlight, aimed up the tun-: 


2 expensive apparatus, and. then: a under. ‘the American" ‘st Boeck 


1 
‘listencd in onRed ‘army, ek Outside “again, ‘the "com 


eephone conversations . sincel 
: the: ‘sunimer. of 1954. vos” | mander. asked us tyhat would! - ; 


To them, -it was, an astound Ibe, the’ reaction-in the United 

” Songs fest, *vnioh * “has -greatly) States.if the Canadians of Mex: 
senhanced: ‘American prestige: | ican’. drove “such a. “ spy 
tunnel" “under. our -borders, 


‘The boldness of burrowing. : 
“*“indor’ the Russian noses, and \¥¢: said ‘the Americans ‘would | 
bes! ‘unhappy.’ aboutibt. ; 


“its “technical accomplishment, “* . 
‘have captured the imagination “SIs it right .or wrong for 
‘Yef:many Germans. ;. An mona, a de ‘this. under 

“No one expected A-sight of: — . a eS 
jthe tunnel teddy when ‘Wate, ou — a 


"Chicago: tet hase 
29 oe | 35 


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APPENDIX D 


NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the PBJOINTLY 
‘staf? as part of the wrap-up of the operation. 


ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS 
REACTION TO THE. DISCOVERY OF THE. 
WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER 


{Sources as Indicated) 


The following is an analysis of the East German press 


reaction to the discovery of the wiretap. tunnel at the sector 


border between West and East Berlin. During the period under. 


review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of. 3] dailies per day- 
and four weeklies were available for scrutiny; however, only 
the dailies. reported and commented on the incident. 


Mostly concerned with reporting and conmenting on the 


sncident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances, 


devoted full pages of. their local sections to reports and pic- 


page treatment to the matter only in few instances, generally 


refrained fron. large articles or commentaries, and often 


carried pictorial material with only brie explanations. The 


least coverage: was noted in the provincial press of other 


tures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second- 


page acccunts.of developments, The provincial press. gave front- 


- ome e@- % ASP =e dew Pete enn ome > 
. . 


Oe woes = sem a se a. 9 


C06828875 


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than SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei. Deutschlands - 


Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers 


‘published any commentary , or any cartoon of their own, on 
the subject: up to 26 April; in fact. 
Describing the tunnel as inspected by. the journalists 
after the Soviet press conférence, the papers pointed out 
that the installation was well designed and constructed, that 
the installation was’ costly and equivalent. to a modern tele- 
phone exchange, and that. the material - of British and Ameri- 
can origin ~ used in the installation was of such quality as 


to: guarantee long service. 


The East Berlin papers, which were leading in the reporta 


on the issue, treated thé matter as a "bitterly serious. inci-~ 
dent” which represents an “international scandal" and a: 
“breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in 
their commentaries, addressed. the West Berlin Senat, demand- 
ing an ali-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity 
for uhited action, and insinuated that. Berlin is being kept 
Givided merely for thé purpose of providing the espionage 


centers in West Berlin.with a base for launching provocations 


against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provincial. 


papers contained calis for vigilance and for defense: prepared- 
neas.. Only one paper printed an editorial on. the incident, 


In commenting on the incident the press did not draw. a line 


~ 


2 
| 
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between the different developments, such.as the press confer- 
ence, the Soviet protest, the GDR Goverment protest, etc.; 
but, a5 a rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as 
@ whole. Later, when the firat reaction of the West Berlin 
press was available, the central press swooped down upon the 
.West Berlin press for attempting: to belittle the incident and 
to divert attention from the “seriousness of the matter." , 
The few caricatures published by. the papers were designed 
to slander. the Americans. a 
Day by. Day. Reaction 


24 April 1956 ss ie = , 
On 24 April 1956 Six East Berlin papers’ printed the ADN 


(Allegéemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German 

. News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press. 
conference, reported on the inspection of. the tunnel by the 
journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko's letter 
of protest (1 = 6). DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6). 
printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six 
provincial SED papers (7 - 12) carried announcements of the 
discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely 
an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has 
been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEVER TAG, 
Frankfurt/OQder, printed the long version of the ADN release (12). 


ty . 2: n 


“C06828875- 


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Provincial. papers of other party affiliations carried no 
reports. 

25_ April 1956 

version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel (13 - 34); 
the: six provincial SED papers which. had carried a brief announce- 
ment the day before followed-up their reports by more extensive 
accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, ea 
the inspection of. the tunnel. {13 - 18). Papers of other party 
affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day. 

Only MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME, ef all provincial papers ; ‘publ ished. 
an. "eye-witness" report containing a. description of the tunnel 
and quoting individuals. who had voiced their. “outrage at. such 

a thing" which produces. new material for conflicts in foreign’ 
policy (16)... SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long 
version of the ADN release, ‘reproduced the first picture of 

the tunnel (22). 

Meanwhile the central presa, in. addition to supplementary 
reports. on the discovery of the tunnel, descriptions of the 
tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel 
auch as the amplifier station, etc., came out with the first 
commentaries. A total of five commentaries appeared on: this 
day. The press treated the matter as a "bitterly serious 


‘affair" which represents an "international scandal” and a 


4 


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"preach of the norms of international law,” pointing. out that 
the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecom- 
munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the 
other hand (35 - 38), NEUES DEUTSCHLAND spoke of 5 new, 

. hitherto unsurpassed “gangster geen of the U.S. secret service 
(35), NATIONAL. ZELTUNG termed the incident: as.a “sensational. 
international scandal" (36) , NEUE ZEIT stressed that there is 
tio word "strong enough to brand such wickedness" (38), and 
JUNGE WELT declared that "this: had to nappen just. to those 
who aiways babble about Communist infiltration but.can never 

- prove it” (39), All commentaries were addressed to the West - 


Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for. the 


purpose of discontinuing the “stubborn adherence to NATO 
policy," achieving the withdrawal of the "cold war. ozhents of 
all shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "grontier 
city," and achieving’a "normalization in the situation in 
Berlin." Three papers reported On. a meeting held ‘by the 
National Front at Alt-Glienicke, at which the population adopted 
a resolution protesting against this "provocation: Franz 
Fischer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive 
Board, was reported, to have said at the meeting that the 
people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this 
installation through the occupation costs and to. tiave terned 


the tunnel as “an appendix of the.cold war" (38, 40, and 41). 


& 
—S-E CO 8-E-F 


Ti 


TRIBUENE, tioreover, referred to a report by thé HAMBURGER 
“ANZEIGER to underscore the fact. that the installations in the 
tunnel were not of provisiondl ‘nature but designed for long 
service (40). DER MORGEN:; déeseribing the tunnel, added that: 
West German correspoiderts who inspected ‘the tunnel ‘noted With 
satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet ‘Lieuteiant Colonel 
that “quite obviously ; Géermiin quarters have no part in this” | 
(41), while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announce- 
ment Made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the 
tunnel was open for public inspection (36). 

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the: 


“issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two 
parts by a sign indicating the "Democratic Sector" - full of 
fiowers, and the opposite side - a barren piéce of land with 
a molehili topped by a4 flag with the dollar sign.’ ‘A strong: 
arm is. pulling out of a hole in the. Democratic Sector a nole 
wearing "U.S,"—marked earphones; some sort ' ‘of Army trousers 
with plugs: and plters. showing from. the pocket, and a U.S, 
Army cap bearing the. legend. "Eapionage."! The cartoon is 
captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards" (35).. 
26 April 1956 

On 26 April. 27 papers cotitinued reporting on the issue 
(42 - 68). In 17 instances the reports were supplenénted 
with pictures as outlined above... A total of 15 papers 

6 
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printed the text of, or large excerpts from, the press release 


‘on the GDR Goverument protest (42 - 56). Six papers reported 


on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press, 


and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 49, 59, 60, 


‘65, and 67). Four papers referred to a report. carried. by. the 


West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists 


were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the. tunnel on the 


Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four papers referred 


to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an "eloquent 
silerice” about the affair on the part of the Americans (42, 51, 
55, and 58). A total of four papers. reported on the Alt~ 
Glienicke meeting (51, 60, 61, and 67). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 
gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the. effect 
that the people of West. Berlin, in particular the SPD members, 
will be invited to inspect the tunnel (51). Three papers re- 


produced caricatures (51, 52, and 56), six papers carried , 


commentaries. (51, 52, 53, 54, 57, and 58), and one paper cane 


out with an editorial (55). Three East Berlin papers, through 


their commentaries, Swooped down upon the West Berlin press 


for its. attitude toward the incident. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 


accused, the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the 
incident and of lauding ‘the ‘efficiency of the American "goblins," 
adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts 


+o divert attention from the seriousness of the matter (51). 


78 
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JUNGE WELT Yashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that, 


oe me ee ee ey 


by its opinion, the west Berlin paper manifests its total loss 
Of any senge of decency. Besides, DER TAG is not in the. teast 
disturbed about the violation also of West periin's territory 
(52).. NATIONAL ZEITUNG hela that DER TAG .now admitted what it 
has been deny ing at all times, namely that West Berlin is a 
de facto part of ‘NATO, adding that ‘DER TAG now regards as 
"eustomary’” the military. ¢ espionage (of. the United States on 
GDR. territory in “addition to. the "customary f*ontier-—city 
policy," ‘the “customary” partition, ‘and’ the ‘customary’ 
diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld i 


organizations. The paper ntronaad that’ all Berliners fully 


agree with the ¥RANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which ‘said. that the 
people must demand the discontinuation of "such things" (38). 
NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire- 
tapping post is a feature of West Berlin's misuse as a NATO: 
base. The paper emphasized that GDR policy. will continue to 
serve a1l-German understanding and relaxation of international 
tensions. "But it mist be kept in mind that the success of 
this policy will not only depend on the volume of the: appeal 
: for peace but also on our ‘preparedness to defend our homeland 
as well as on our vigilance regarding ‘the prevention of dan- 
gers resulting from the fact that one ‘part of. Berlin has be-. 


come a frontier city against ‘peace,’ the paper added. What 


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we need are contact points above the ground and in full 
Light, nanely all-German talks, and not underground trenches 
in the cold war" (55). 

The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt 
with the incident as an example of proof for East. German press 
reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, .Kari-Marx-Stadt, 
pointed out that the tnnel Yepresents "a document” which is, 
quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto 


been inclined to regard East German press reports: about the 


j underground activities of Western espionage services. a8 


“exaggerated” (57).  MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several 
workers who voiced their indignation over "such a. vileness! 
which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that. 
the "Western side" is just as quiet about. this “unpleasant 
affair" as the population is Gutraged. (53). And LEIPZIGER 
YOLKSZBITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the. discovery 
of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at. 


maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U.S. espio- 


nage service, adding that this “breach of international law" 


‘also places the West Berlin administration "in a peculiar 


light.” The paper reminded its readers that war preparation, 


which ‘formerly marched on Prussian. Army boots," is now 


marching on "Américan rubber soles, chewing gun, and tapping 
telephone lines" @4). 


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‘NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier try~- 


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ing in vain to "milk" a disconnected, oversized telephone. re- 
ceiver into. a bucket marked "crc" while another ‘soldier is : 
thoughtfully standing by (51). JUNGE WELT reproduced a car-. | 
toon showing a mole wearing a U.S. Army cap on its head and 
a telephone receiver on its back halting before a Sign which 
warns that "spies axe now facing danger." The cartoon is, 
captioned, ‘The Underworld that Shuns the ean cal tenes. 
noted, “Damned, we ‘did hot put up that sign" (52). FRELES 
WORT showed rats. wearing U.S. Army caps being disturbed by 


PO Teeny ent eet i 


@ Russian soldier in the operation of what looks like 2 


communication center. ‘wo rats are shown facing the soldier 
in strprise, another standing with arms ‘raised, and: still 
another escaping through an opening in the walk. The 

cpr aeeruee is. entitled, "Unpleasant Surprise," and footnoted, 
“It is an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us ‘in Our 
‘Gurrowing) Work" (56). 


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see _ 
SOURCES: 
L9G: 
1. NEVES DEUTSCHLAND 24 Apr 
2. NEVE ZEIT 2? 24 Apr 
3.  TRIBUENE ; 24 Apr 
. 4, NATIONAL ZEITUNG a? 24 Apr 
5. “DER MORGEN 24 Apr 
6. BERLINER ZEITUNG . 24. Apr. 
%. FREIHEIT 24 Apr 
8. SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 24 Apr 
9. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt. 24 Apr . 
10. MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 24.-Apr : 
11, LEIPZIGER ‘YVOLKSZEITUNG : 24: Apr 
12... -NEUER TAG 24 Apr 
13. ‘FREIHEIT zo Apr 
14. SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 25 Apr 
15, VOLKSSTIMNE, Karl-Marx-Stadt 25 Apr 
16, MSERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 29 Apr 
17... LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG 25 Apr 
18. NEVER TAG | 29 Apr 
‘49. LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAD: —— 25 Apr 
20. VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg 25 Apr 
21. DAS. VOLK,. Erfurt 25 Apr 
22. SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG 25 Apr 
23. FREIE ERDE. 25 Apr 
24. OSTSEE ZEITUNG 25 Apr 
25. VOLKSWACHT 25 Apr 
26. FREIES WORT eS 25. Apr 
27. SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT . 25 Apr 
28. DIE UNION 25 Apr 
29. NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN 25 Apr 
30. MAERKISCHE. UNION 25 Apr 
31. BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUVESTE NABBR , 25. Apr 
32. BAUERN ECHO 25. Apr 
33. DER NEUE WEG. 25 Apr 
34. LIBERAL DEMOKRATI SCHE ZEITUNG 25. Apr 
35. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND : 25: Apr 
36. ‘NATIONAL ZEITUNG 25 Apr 
37. BERLENER ZEITUNG 25 ‘Apr 
38, NEUE ZEIT | 25 Apr: 
39. JUNGE WELT : 25 Apr 
40, . TRIBUENE 25. Apr 
41, DER MORGEN ; 25 Apr 
13 


C06828875 


BERLINER ZEITUNG 
SAECHSISCHE ZELTUNG. 
‘DAS: VOLK, Erfurt 
NEVER TAG . 

FREIHEI?T 

DER MORGEN. 

TRI BUENE 

BAUERN. ECHO. 

DER NEVE WEG 

NEVES DEUTSCHLAND 
JUNGE WELT — 
MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTEMME 
LEIPZI GER VOLKSZEITUNG 
NEVE ZE It 

FREIES WORT 


VOLKSSTIMME, iid diiiaia tien 


NATIONAL ZE i TONG 
VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg 


MAERKISCHE UNION 


FREIE ERDE 

LEIPZIGER VOLESZEI TUNG 
VOLKSWACHT 

SAECHSISCHES TAGEBLATT 
OSTSEE ZEITUNG. 
LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU 

DIE UNION 

SCEWERINER VOLKSZEI TUNG. 


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